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INTRODUCTION
Due in part to overly-optimistic economic forecasts and questiona-
ble financial practices during the 1980s, many corporations are now
caught under crushing debtloads that become increasingly difficult to
service. For many of these debt-laden corporations, a bankruptcy re-
organization is the only feasible survival alternative. As a result, the
legal system, more specifically the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,1 will play
an unprecedented role in the repair and restructuring of the Ameri-
can economy in the 1990s. As reorganizations are carried out under
the Code and workouts take place in its shadow, the courts' interpre-
tation of the Code could make the difference between stagnation and
a stable capital structure for the economy. Fair treatment of equity
holders is essential to preserve the going-concern value of businesses.
Forthright treatment of creditors is needed so as not to fuel a credit
crunch and its resultant economic stagnation. Furthermore, as the
market for trading bankruptcy claims burgeons, investors will de-
mand uniformity from the bankruptcy courts. Whereas the trend in
the 1980s was to increase debt for tax and other reasons, the pendu-
lum will swing back in the 1990s toward deleveraging.2 As investors
trade claims in bankruptcy, risks will be shifted to those best able
and most eager to bear them. To the extent that the markets for
these securities are efficient, our net standard of living will be
elevated.
Consistency from the courts in determining interest and discount
rates will facilitate the financial restructuring of the economy. This
Article formulates a basic framework to determine interest and dis-
count rates applicable to secured claims in bankruptcy. Section I re-
views the function of the interest rate from a macroeconomic
perspective. The time-value-of-money concept explained in this sec-
tion shows the later a cash flow comes in time, the less it is worth.
Section II evaluates the treatment debtors and creditors receive dur-
ing the gap period3 by examining how courts have struggled with the
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)) [hereinafter the Code] (section references
are to the Code).
2. See Sandra E. Mayerson & Joseph E. Sarachek, Trading Claims: The New
Bankruptcy Game, Any Number Can Play, in BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS FOR
WORKOUT OFFICERS AND LENDERS COUNSEL 609 (1990); Sally S. Neely & Richard L.
Epling, Investing in Troubled Companies and Trading in Claims and Interests in Chap-
ter 11 Cases-A Brave New World, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, CHAPTER
11 BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS (1991); Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Trad-
ing Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CAR)ozo L. REV. 1
(1990); Andrew Africk, Comment, Trading Claims in Chapter 11: How Much Influence
Can Be Purchased in Good Faith Under Section 1126?, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1393 (1991).
3. The Gap Period is the time between the filing of the bankruptcy petition and the
confirmation of the plan. HARVEY M. LEBOWITZ. BANKRUPTCY DESK3OOK 97 (2d ed.
1990).
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Code to award post-petition interest. Section III develops a method
for determining the appropriate interest or discount rate applicable
to a secured claim by referring to the corporate bond market.
I. THE TIME VALUE OF MONEY
A. The Emergence of Money
Before money came into use, people bartered their goods and ser-
vices for the goods and services of others. As people sought to im-
prove their standards of living, job specialization became necessary.
The use of money arose as a practical alternative to barter. Money is
a convenient storage device that facilitates the exchange of goods
and services. A person earns money so that he may consume goods
and services other than his own.
B. The U.S. Monetary System
The Federal Reserve Bank introduces money into society via loans
to banks around the country. Money is created by an accounting
entry on the Federal Reserve's books and is loaned out to the banks.
The Federal Reserve expects that value will be created in the econ-
omy through loans, and the value created will correspond to the in-
terest charged on the loans. Money has value because 'only the
Federal Reserve can introduce money, and it does so sparingly.
Thus, money is scarce, and, like gold and diamonds, considered valu-
able. Although the Federal Reserve can introduce as much money as
it desires, everyone has faith that it will not. Because the Federal
Reserve is expected to be. cdreful to keep the supply of money in line
with the expansion of the economy, everyone agrees that money is
scarce, and therefore, worth working for."
C. The Incentive to Earn Money
The holder of money holds an obligation from everyone in the rest
of the world to make him better off. Generally, a person obtains
money by doing something to make someone else better off.' In our
society, a person cannot survive without money. Therefore, a person
works now to incur obligations from everyone else. This allows him
4. On the other hand, many Latin American governments print up money wildly
every time they get into a jam. Their money is no longer scarce, so no one values it, and
it becomes worthless.
5. Of course there are exceptions: inheritance, gambling, etc.
to consume the goods and services of others later. Once a person
obtains money, he must decide how to use it to maximize his
welfare.
D. The Real Interest Rate
In the interest of their own survival, generally, people want to con-
sume as many goods and services as they can as soon as possible.
However, resources are limited, and not everyone can have every-
thing at the present time. Some mechanism must therefore serve as a
valve between consumption now and investment for later. Interest
rates serve as this valve. Interest is the reward a person gets for
putting off consumption. Societal preferences and market supply and
demand forces determine the component of the interest rate known
as the real interest rate.6
When a person has some money, he has a choice between spending
it now or investing it for later. However, other people want to borrow
his money to fund their own present consumption, and they are will-
ing to offer him a reward for putting off consumption. This reward is
referred to as the real interest rate and is in effect the "profit" a
lender makes for putting off consumption. After money is borrowed,
it can be used for present consumption (or use of resources). As peo-
ple consume more and more in the present, money to fund this con-
sumption becomes more scarce. As money becomes more scarce, a
higher interest rate, or reward, is needed to induce people to lend
their money to others. Therefore, people will consume until the inter-
est rate has risen to a point where they feel the reward for investing
for later is equal to the pleasure of consuming in the present. The
current interest rate is therefore a reflection of the trade-off people
are making between consumption now and investment for the future.
This reward, or real interest rate, is just one of the two components
that determines the nominal risk-free interest rate.
E. Inflation
Inflation, in addition to the real interest rate, is built into the nom-
inal risk-free interest rate. The nominal risk-free rate, rf, is equal to
6. During the 1980s, U.S. interest rates had been generally higher than Japanese
interest rates because, inter alia, the Japanese, as a matter of culture, preferred to save
more than Americans. Therefore, less of an incentive (a lower real interest rate) was
needed to entice them into putting off their consumption until later.
7. The nominal rate is also known as the current, quoted, or stated rate. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1049 (6th ed. 1990) (defining nominal interest rate as "[t]he
rate of interest stated in a security as opposed to the actual interest yield that is based
upon the price at which the interest-bearing property is purchased and the length of time
to maturity of the obligation").
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the real rate, rR, plus the expected inflation rate.8
When people consume now instead of later, the demand for goods
and services increases. As this demand increases, goods and services
become scarcer. The providers of the goods and services then realize
they can charge more for their products, so prices rise. As prices
rise, inflation9 occurs. If a person knows that a year from now a
dollar is going to buy less because of inflation, he will want to con-
sume now in order to get the most for his money. To offset this, even
more of a reward must be given to prevent the person from choosing
to consume now. Thus, the current interest rate must reflect not only
the real interest rate, but also the expected inflation rate.
F. The Nominal Interest Rate
The nominal risk-free interest rate compensates a person for in-
vesting for the future instead of consuming now. A person can invest
in government securities and be sure to receive interest cash flows at
the nominal risk-free rate. The nominal interest rate is simply the
market's best estimate of how much compensation is required to in-
duce a person to invest for later. When a person decides to lock in
his money at a specified rate for a long period of time, he could win
big if interest rates fall the day after he invests. He will have secured
an obligation to receive a big reward when everyone else must settle
for less of a reward, and he can sell the rights to the relatively larger
reward.' 0
The interest rate can be higher on some investments than on
others because, unlike government securities, loans to private entities
are not risk-free. For example, the borrower might default, and then
the lender would not receive any reward. If the investment is not
risk-free, a risk premium rate must then be added to the interest rate
to compensate the lender for assuming this default risk. Assessing
the appropriate risk premium is addressed in Section III.
8. This is an approximation. Actually, a one dollar security has an expected real
rate of interest, r,, where rf = r + r inflation +r r inflation" The cross product, rR r inflaoIof
is assumed to be insignificant because it is so small. Furthermore, the nominal risk-free rate,
rf, does in fact include a premium to offset the risk associated with inflation.
9. See WEBSTER'S THIRD_ NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1159 (1986) (defin-
ing inflation as "an increase in the volume of money and credit relative to available goods
resulting in a substantial and continuing rise in the general price level"); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990) (defining inflation as "[a]n overall rise in
prices which results in a decline in the real value of the dollar").
10. This explains why bond prices fall when interest rates go up and rise when
interest rates go down. A bond may be sold at any time to another investor, regardless of
maturity, if the holder wants to realize the gain or loss on the bond price.
The point of this discussion is that the interest rate determines the
equilibrium point at which people are just as happy to borrow to
receive the pleasure of consuming in the present or to lend to receive
the reward for investing for later. If the interest rate is lower than
this equilibrium point, people will consume until the interest rate
rises to this equilibrium point, and vice versa if the interest rate is
too high. Therefore, the interest rate reflects the point where people
are in general equally happy to be either borrowing or lending
money according to their consumption and investment preferences.
Thus, on average, people should be indifferent toward either spend-
ing money now or receiving the interest rate reward for postponing
consumption. For example, if the interest rate is 10% per year, a
person should be just as happy with $1 today as he is with $1.10 a
year from now ($1 + 10% of $1). Thus, the future value one year
from now of having $1 today is $1.10. By the same principle, a per-
son should have no preference between receiving 910 today and $1 a
year from now since 910 plus 10% (90) equals $1. So if a person
knows he is going to receive $1 a year from now, and the interest
rate is 10 %, that $1 has a present value of 91¢. The important point
here is that if a person accepts the interest rate"1 as equal to 10%
per year, there is absolutely no difference between having $1 today
and $1.10 a year from now. For this reason the interest rate could
more accurately be called the "indifference rate."
G. Present and Future Values
If $1 is invested today at 10%, in one year it would grow to $1.10,
and in two years to $1.21 (not $1.20). This result occurs because the
interest is compounded, that is, the 10¢ interest earned after the first
year will earn 1 0 interest for itself during the second year. The "mir-
acle" of compound interest is that the interest keeps earning interest.
For example, the present value of $1 that will be received two years
from now would be 830 (assuming a 10% interest rate). This is be-
cause 830 invested today would earn interest of 8¢ after the first
year, and that 8¢ of earned interest would earn an additional 1¢ of
interest in the second year. Therefore, the total in year two is $1. As
indicated in Figure 1, the future value two years from now of 83¢
today is 83¢ times one plus the interest rate for a total of 910 after
year one and a total of 910 times one plus the interest rate for a
total of $1 at the end of year two.
11. Interest rates and discount rates refer to the same rate. At an annual interest
rate of 10%, $10 will earn $1 of interest in one year. [$1OX(I + .1)=$I 1]. Conversely,
a discount rate of 10% is used to find that $11 a year from now is worth $10 today.
[$11/(1 + .1)=$10]. In the context of bonds and notes, this rate is referred to as the
"yield," whereas in the context of capital budgeting it is referred to as the "capitalization
rate."
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Figure 1: Compound Interest Illustrated
If C is the nominal cash flow received, PV is the present value, r is
the interest rate and n is the number of years or periods later that
the cash flow is received, then:
12
C
PV= (1 + r)""
In other words, the present value of a stream of cash flows is equal
to the sum of the discounted flows or
n
PV = - 13
i~l (I + r/
For example, suppose the nominal interest rate is 10% ,14 and four
cash flows will be received: $60 at the end of the first, second and
third six-month periods, and $1,060 at the end of the second year.
Here, Ci=,, Ci=2 , and C,=3 equal $60 and C,=4., equals $1,060.
Using the equation above, the present value of these flows equals:
$60 $60 $60 $1060+ + + or $1,035.
(1 + .05)1 (1 + .05)2 (I + .05)3 (1 + 
.05) $
12. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF -CORPORATE FI-
NANCE 29 (3d ed. 1988). n
13. The summation notation, 2 ,is read as "the sum of the following terms of
i=1 to n." i=1
14. The per-period rate is equal to the nominal interest rate, r, divided by the
number of periods per year. The nominal interest rate is almost always quoted as a per-
year rate despite compounding. With payments every six months, the effective interest
rate per year, re. is 10.25%, [r, = (1+.10/2)2-1]. If interest is compounded continuously
(once every moment), the effective interest rate per year is 10.52%, [r, = exp(rt)-l,
r,=exp(.1)-l where exp(x) = ex=2.718X].
H. Perpetuities
The above analysis shows today's value of a series of cash flows
coming in the future. But what is the value today of a series of cash
flows continuing forever? Imagine a person has $1 that he decides he
will never spend, but he will spend the 10% interest that it earns
each year. At the end of each year, he will receive a cash flow of
10¢, spend it, and then still have the same $1 left over to do the
same thing the next year. Theoretically, he could do this for a hun-
dred or even an infinite number of years. The 100 cash flow that he
receives each year forever is called a perpetuity. 15 By our previous
interest rate analysis, a person agreeing that the interest rate is 10%
should be equally happy to receive either $1 today or 100 every year
forever.
The notable concept here is that a level stream of payments ex-
tending forever into time must be pictured as exactly the same as a
single flow equal to the first flow, C, divided by the interest rate, r.
Therefore, we represent the present value of a perpetuity as
_C
PV perpetuity - alternatively, C = r X P' perpetuity
Using this formula, a person who will receive 100 every year forever
can find the value of these flows by dividing $.10 by .1 (or dividing
$.10 by 10%) to come up with a present value of $1. That is, since
$1 could generate 100 per year forever at 10% interest, 10¢ per year
forever must be worth $1.
L Annuities
Imagine that a debtor is buying an office, and the interest rate
that he and the creditor agree upon is 10%. Suppose the office is
worth $100,000 if he pays cash today, but he wishes to make equal
yearly payments on it over thirty years. The debtor and creditor
must then ask: What yearly flow of cash over the next thirty years
would be the equivalent of $100,000 paid today, knowing that the
interest rate is 10% ? If the creditor says this amount equals $10,608
per year for thirty years, the debtor can check this figure using the
above equations.
If the debtor instead agreed to pay the creditor $10,608 every year
in perpetuity, the office would be worth $106,080 because $10,608
divided by 10% is $106,080. In other words, if the creditor had
$106,080 today he could invest it at 10% and get back $10,608 each
year forever. However, the office costs $100,000 not $106,080, and
15. A perpetuity is a level stream of payments occurring for an unlimited period of
time. See also WEBSTERS, supra note 9, at 1685 (defining perpetuity as "[a]n annuity
payable indefinitely").
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the debtor will not make payments in perpetuity but will make his
last payment at the end of year thirty.
Consider instead that the debtor will in fact have to make a
$10,608 payment every year forever, but also that after year thirty
the creditor starts paying the debtor $10,608 per year in perpetuity
so that in effect the payments after year thirty cancel out. This
would allow the debtor to subtract today's value of the perpetuity he
will receive from the creditor thirty years from now from the value
of the perpetuity he is going to start to pay today, and he will know
the value of the stream of his thirty payments.
At the end of year thirty, the value of the $10,608 per year
perpetuity that the creditor is going to start paying the debtor will be
$106,080. So at the end of year thirty, the debtor will be receiving
$106,080. To determine how much that $106,080 thirty years from
now is worth today, use the present value formula above. This
formula shows:
C _ $106,080PV =- - $6,080.
(1 + r)n (1 + .1)3
o
Therefore, the value of the office must be $106,080 minus $6,080,
or $100,000. From this we see:
r r (1 + r)n
Rearranging this equation algebraically gives us the present value of
an annuity:' 6
PVannuityC- - 1- 1 )
r (1 +r)n
J. Application to Section 1111(b)
A creditor's total claim in bankruptcy is bifurcated into secured
and unsecured claims.17 Section 1111(b)' 8 gives an undersecured
creditor the option of electing to receive the present value of his se-
cured claim paid over a period of time that would allow the face
16. Id. at 88 (defining annuity as "[a]n amount payable yearly, at regular intervals
(such as quarterly), or for a certain or uncertain period (such as for years, for life, or in
perpetuity)"); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 90 (6th ed. 1990) (defining annuity as
"[a] fixed sum payable to a person at specified intervals for a specified period of time or
for life").
17. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1988).
amounts of the payments to equal the amount of the creditor's un-
secured and secured claims.19 Section 1111 (b) was enacted in an at-
tempt to avoid the result in In re Pine Gate Associates, Ltd. 0 In
Pine Gate, the creditors had loaned the debtor funds to build condo-
miniums on a nonrecourse basis. In the middle of construction the
debtor reorganized, and the court limited the creditor's total claim to
the value of the unfinished buildings. This deprived the creditors of
the increased value the buildings would have had upon their
completion.
Upon electing section 1111 (b) treatment, the creditor receives the
present value of the secured portion of his total claim via deferred
cash payments. The nominal dollar amounts the deferred cash pay-
ments total is equal to the amount of the total claim.. The creditor's
total claim is deemed "secured. '2 1 Even though the creditor is no
better off if the reorganization succeeds, since he is still only receiv-
ing the present value of his secured claim, if the plan fails post-con-
firmation, he has recourse against the debtor-in-possession for the
total claim. 22 Thus, if the creditor is not confident in the debtor's
prospects to reorganize successfully, the section 11 1 (b) election
could prove to be a wise choice. Under section 1111 (b) in the Pine
Gate situation, the creditor would have been no better off if the reor-
ganization were successful; however, if the reorganization plan
failed, he could have enforced his total claim against the completed
19. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1988) provides:
(b)(1)(A) A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be allowed
or disallowed under section 502 of this title the same as if the holder of such
claim had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not
such holder has such recourse, unless-
(i) the class of which such claim is a part elects, by at least two-thirds in
amount and more than half in number of allowed claims of such class, applica-
tion of paragraph (2) of this subsection; or
(ii) such holder that does not have such recourse and such property is sold
under section 363 of this title or is to be sold under the plan.
(B) A class of claims may not elect application of paragraph (2) of this subsec-
tion if-
(i) the interest on account of such claims of the holders of such claims in
such property is of inconsequential value; or
(ii) the holder of a claim of such class has recourse against the debtor on
account of such claim and such property is sold under section 363 of this title
or is to be sold under the plan.
(2) If such an election is made, then notwithstanding section 506(a) of this
title, such claim is a secured claim to the extent that such claim is allowed,
20. 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976).
21. The nominal dollar amount that the deferred cash payments total is of no eco-
nomic significance. That is, the time value of these flows must be considered before these
payments can be valued.
22. David G. Carlson, Undersecured Claims Under Bankruptcy Code Sections
506(a) and 1111(b): Second Looks at Judicial Valuations of Collateral, 6 BANKsR. DEv.
J. 253, 294 (1989); Margaret Howard, Stripping Down Liens: Section 506(d) and the
Theory of Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373, 398-99 (1991).
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buildings.
Using the above formulas, the cash flows provided under section
1111 (b) election can be calculated. Suppose a creditor has a claim
for $250,000, of which only $100,000 is secured by collateral. Sec-
tion III discusses determination of the interest rate, so for this exam-
ple assume that the appropriate risk-adjusted rate is 10% per year.
Also assume that the payments are made monthly, which implies
that r equals .1/12 or .00833 (.833%) per month. The face value of
the payments must equal $250,000. Assume that the cash payments,
C, will be made monthly for n months. We then know that:
$250,000
C x n = $250,000 alternatively, C = $0
n
We also know that the present value of the cash flows for n months
must equal the amount of the secured claim:
C ( 1- 1
$100,000 - C A 1 -1
0.00833 (1 + 0.00833)
n
Substituting $250,000/n for C, we have:
$250,000 - 1 
$100,000 (n X 0.00833) 1 - (1 + 0.00833)
n
We can then find n that satisfies the above equation2 3 by numerical
methods.24 Here we find that n equals 267 months (22.25 years).
This yields a monthly payment of $250,000/267, or $936.
In H&M Parmely Farms v. Farmers Home Administration,25 the
creditors made a similar section 1111 (b) election. Under the plan of
reorganization in Parmely, the creditor retained its mortgage on its
entire claim of $241,741 and was to receive its secured claim of
$131,755 with interest of 5% per year in thirty-two annual pay-
ments of $8,337.
23. Actually, n is the minimum number of periods over which the claim can be
repaid. Unless this were the case, a creditor with a total claim of $100,001 could force
full immediate payment if the secured portion were $100,000. Likewise, a creditor should
be permitted to waive a portion of the total claim so that the repayment period is not
inordinately long.
24. For example, in Lotus 1-2-3 for Windows, enter (250000/(0.00833*A3))*(1-
(1/(1 + 0.00833))^A3) in cell Al and 100000 in cell A2. Click TOOLS, click BACK-
SOLVER. When prompted for MAKE CELL:, enter Al; when prompted for EQUAL TO
VALUE:, enter A2; when prompted for By CHANGING CELL:, enter A3. Click SOLVE. The
solution for n will then appear in cell A3.
25. 127 B.R. 644 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1990).
K. Summary of the Time Value of Money
Money is valuable because it is scarce. It secures an obligation
from everyone else to make its holder better off. One usually cannot
obtain money unless he makes someone else better off or at least
promises to do so.
A cash flow received in the future is worth less than the same cash
flow received today. The amount that the future cash flow must be
discounted is proportional to the interest rate. The interest rate is
determined by supply and demand forces in the market. Interest
rates regulate the trade-offs people must make to consume now
rather than in the future. The interest rate is set by the collective
wisdom of the market based on the expected economic conditions
and the risk associated with the expected cash flows. Anyone who
could consistently make better estimates than the market as to the
"true" interest rate could make millions on Wall Street.
As shown above, the interest rate is a key concept in borrowing
and lending. When a court supersedes market mechanisms to award
interest, the time value of money must be considered.
II. INTEREST DURING THE GAP PERIOD (POST-PETITION
INTEREST)
A. Presumption Against Entitlement to Post-petition Interest
As a general rule, a creditor is not entitled to post-petition interest
according to section 502(b)(2). 26 The Supreme Court's decision in
Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green27 underlies sec-
tion 502(b)(2). 28 In Vanston, the Court stated that in order to pre-
serve the estate for a pro-rata distribution, no creditor should be able
to gain an advantage by collecting interest over the gap period be-
cause the delay in payment is imposed by operation of law. Notwith-
standing the exception in subsection II C., infra, undersecured and
unsecured creditors may not receive compensation for the opportu-
nity cost or time value of their claims, even under an adequate pro-
tection theory. In United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of
26. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsections (e)(2), (), (g), (h) and (i) of this section,
if such objection to a claim is made, the court, after notice and a hearing, shall
determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as
of the date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such
amount, except to the extent that -
(2) such claim is for unmatured interest ...
Id.
27. 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
28. See American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261,
266-68 (1914); Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U.S. 95, 116-17 (1893).
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Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.,29 the Supreme Court ruled that an
undersecured creditor is not entitled to compensation via adequate
protection for the delay it experiences in foreclosing on the
collateral.30
B. Cashing Out the Secured Creditor
Withstanding the exceptions discussed infra, the debtor may cash
out the secured creditor and leave him unimpaired under sec-
tions 1124(3) and 1126(f). These sections, combined with sec-
tion 502(b), allow the debtor to avoid paying post-petition interest to
the unimpaired secured creditor.3' In spite of the general rule
against post-petition interest, the Code makes exceptions where the
debtor is solvent or the creditor is oversecured.
C. Post-petition Interest is Awarded if Debtor is Solvent
By combining section 1129(a)(7), which says that a creditor must
receive at least as much as he would in a Chapter 7 liquidation, with
section 726(a)(5), a creditor will receive post-petition interest at the
legal rate in the unlikely event that the debtor is solvent; that is,
there are funds left over after the distributions to other claimants.
Some courts interpret the legal rate as referring to the state judg-
ment rate3 2 while others interpret the legal rate as referring to the
federal judgment rate.
33
29. 484 U.S. 365 (1988); but see In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d
426 (9th Cir. 1984) (essentially overruled by Timbers).
30. For a discussion on the interaction between adequate protection and post-peti-
tion interest, see David G. Carlson, Post-petition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code,
43 U. MIAhn L. REV. 577 (1989); Note, "Adequate Protection" and the Availability of
Postpetition Interest to Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1106
(1987); see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations
and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection
of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984);.Frances F. Gecker,
Comment, The Recovery of Opportunity Costs as Just Compensation: A Takings Analy-
sis of Adequate Protection, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 953 (1987); Thomas 0. Kelly III, Com-
ment, Compensation for Time Value of as Part of Adequate Protection During the
Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 305 (1983).
31. See Chaim J. Fortgang & Lawrence P. King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code:
Some Wrong Policy Decisions, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1148, 1155-56 (1981); but see In re
Shaffer Furniture Co., 68 B.R. 827 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
32. In re Marx, 11 B.R. 819, 821 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
33. In re Laymon, 117 B.R. 856 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990). The federal judgment
rate is equal to the 52-week Treasury bills rate under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1988).
D. Oversecured Creditors are Entitled to Post-petition Interest
In In re Sun Valley Ranches, Inc.,34 the court reasoned that since
an oversecured creditor has an equity cushion, he would be overcom-
pensated if he were to receive opportunity cost payments. This rea-
soning is flawed because such a result would deprive the oversecured
creditor of his pre-confirmation opportunity costs. 35 The better view
is expressed in In re Lipply, 36 wherein the court stated,
The property is worth approximately five times the amount of Land Bank's
lien ... there is no imminent danger that Land Bank could be placed in a
partially unsecured position. Land Bank's claim is secure; the time value of
its position is not . . .Land Bank is entitled to protection of its lost rein-
vestment opportunity cost.
3 7
Most courts agree that by the language of the Code, under sec-
tion 506(b), a secured creditor is entitled to post-petition interest to
the extent that he is oversecured.38 Post-petition interest is awarded
only up to the value of the collateral. 39 In other words, once post-
petition interest has been awarded to the point that the creditor is no
longer oversecured, the creditor is no longer entitled to post-petition
interest under section 506(b).40 Post-petition interest is paid out of
the equity cushion 41 and is treated as part of the secured claim.
The Supreme Court has interpreted that due to the placement of
the commas in section 506(b), the phrase "interest on such claim" is
separate and divorced from "provided for in the agreement under
which such claim arose.' ' 42 That is, the oversecured creditor is enti-
tled to some rate of interest, but not necessarily the rate provided for
in the agreement. Thus, the contract rate is irrelevant.43 Because
34. 43 B.R. 641, 643-44 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1984).
35. Evan D. Flaschen, Adequate Protection for Oversecured Creditors, 61 ANI.
BANKR. L. J. 341, 356 (1987).
36. 56 B.R. 524 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986).
37. Id. at 527; see also In re Embrey, 56 B.R. 626, 628-29 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1986); In re Orlando, 53 B.R. 245, 249 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988) provides:
(b) To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the
value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is
greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of
such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges
provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.
Id.
39. In re Evans Products Co., 85 B.R. 636, 638-39 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988).
40. In re Ladycliff College, 56 B.R. 765, 767 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1985).
41. United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S.
365 (1988).
42. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989) (this
interpretation was used to decide the narrow issue that a nonconsensual secured creditor,
i.e., a creditor that became so when there was "no agreement under which such claim
arose," was entitled to post-petition interest).
43. See David G. Carlson, Oversecured Creditors Under Bankruptcy Code Section
506(b): The Limits of Postpetition Interest, Attorneys' Fees, and Collection Expenses, 7
BANKR. DEV. J. 381, 385-86 (1990).
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courts have had no guidance in determining this critical rate, the
treatment received by litigants has been inconsistent and
unpredictable.
In In re Laymon,"I the court used the 52-week Treasury-bill rate
to calculate post-petition interest under section 506(b). The Laymon
court reasoned that the legal rate45 required under section 726(a)(5)
should be carried over into section 506(b)."6 The court further rea-
soned that awarding a rate higher than the legal rate would be un-
fair to other creditors who were not a party to the original
contract.47
However, using the federal judgment rate does not compensate the
creditor for the risks he incurs due to the debtor's use of his capital.
As Section I indicates, the interest rate has three components: the
real rate, expected inflation, and the risk premium. In an efficient
market, creditors will not lend unless the transaction makes them no
worse off than if they invested their money elsewhere. The Treasury-
bill rate is equal to the real rate plus expected inflation. It does not
include a risk premium because Treasury bills are risk-free. If worse
comes to worse, the Treasury will print more money to satisfy its
obligations to the holders. This may have inflationary ramifications,
but the holder is always assured of receiving the dollar amounts due
him. In a bankruptcy setting, the creditor's claim is far from risk-
free. The creditor entails the risk that the debtor will disperse what
is left of the firm's assets resulting in reduced or no payments on the
claim. Lenders and borrowers carefully assess the risks inherent in
each loan, and arrive at a risk premium to be added to the risk-free
rate to offset the risk inherent in the loan. That is, the more likely it
is that the creditor will lose some or all of his money, the higher the
risk premium must be to entice him into entering the transaction.
The risk premium is an essential component of the interest rate, and
it must compensate the creditor for taking on the risk of the loan.
After a bankruptcy filing, a creditor generally faces even more risk
than he did when he entered the contract. To award anything less
than a risk-adjusted rate deprives the creditor of the risk premium
that is inherent in the interest rate provided for in section 506(b). If
44. 117 B.R. 856, 861 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
45. In this case, the court assumed that the legal rate was equal to the federal
judgment rate rather than the state judgment rate.
46. See Kathryn R. Heidt, Interest Under Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code:
The Right, the Rate and the Relationship to Bankruptcy Policy, 1991 UTAH L. REV.
361, 400-02 (1991) (criticizing Laymon).
47. 117 B.R. at 863.
a creditor expects Chapter 11 to strip him of his risk premium, then
he would have to raise his interest rates and collateral requirements
to offset the "bankruptcy risk." Even if favoring bankrupts by
spreading this risk among all borrowers in the market might make
sense from a policy standpoint, inefficiencies result to the extent that
treatment of creditors is inconsistent. To the extent creditors can
predict what they will receive in a bankruptcy proceeding, they will
be able to charge rates that accurately reflect the risks they are
bearing.
Notwithstanding Ron Pair,48 some courts have awarded post-peti-
tion interest at the contract rate.49 Other courts have taken different
approaches. In In re Laza,50 the court held that instead of the con-
tract rate, a reasonable post-petition rate approved on a case-by-case
basis should be used. Thus, the court used a rate of 8 %, based on
the current money-market opportunities, to award section 506(b)
post-petition interest on the oversecured creditor's second
mortgage.
51
In In re Elmwood Farm, Inc.,5 the court awarded the oversecured
creditor section 506(b) interest at 15 %, the post-default penalty
rate provided in the mortgage notes. 53 Courts have also rejected us-
ing a "late-charge" post-default rate, opting instead to use the New
York statutory rate54 (9 %) to award section 506(b) interest where
the claim had been reduced to a judgment. 5 The Lehal court stated
that using a post-default penalty rate would not be appropriate
where a judgment had been entered.56 Where the claim arises from a
nonconsensual obligation, e.g., taxes, courts have deferred to rates
established by the statute creating the claim.57 Courts have also cho-
sen rates based on equitable principles.58
E. Equity Cushion Considerations
Rather than allow a bankruptcy court to fashion an interest rate,
the parties may negotiate a new rate after the bankruptcy filing. In
other words, if both parties agree that interest is due and wish to
48. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
49. In re Anderson, 833 F.2d 834, 836 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Loveridge Mach. &
Tool Co. Inc., 36 B.R. 159, 162-65 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
50. 69 B.R. 669, 671 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1987).
51. Id.
52. 19 B.R. 338, 340-41 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1982).
53. See In re Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500, 511 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987); contra In
re DWJ Invs. Inc., 121 B.R. 845, 849-50 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
54. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 5004 (McKinney 1992).
55. In re Lehal Realty Assocs., 112 B.R. 588, 589-90 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1990).
56. Id. at 589.
57. In re Busone, 71 B.R. 201, 204 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1987).
58. See, e.g., In re Lauretti Corp., 86 B.R. 751, 754-55 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986).
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avoid litigation, they may simply agree upon a rate. Of course, they
will have to negotiate within certain bounds so as not to draw objec-
tions from other creditors. This may be a very wise choice for the
secured creditor if his equity cushion is thin. Once the equity cushion
is exhausted, no additional post-petition interest is payable, no mat-
ter what rate is used. The equity cushion also may deteriorate due to
attorney's fees,59 costs, and charges, as long as these items were pro-
vided for in the original security agreement.6 0 Assuming the equity
cushion is 15 % and a federal judgment rate of 6 % is used, the eq-
uity cushion will be exhausted in a gap period61 of less than two and
one-half years. 2 Negotiating for a higher rate would be unproduc-
tive since at a higher rate the equity cushion would be exhausted
earlier, after which no interest would accrue. A secured creditor
should consider this before engaging in costly litigation to secure a
higher rate.
III. POST-CONFIRMATION DISCOUNT RATES
A. Confirmation and Cram Down
Absent federal code provisions, state law governs the disposition of
a creditor's security upon default.6 3 However, the Code provides for
an orderly disposition of the debtor's assets upon the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition. 4 Often, a business is worth more as going concern
59. Under § 506(b), if provided for in the security agreement, attorney's fees must
be awarded even if such an award is contrary to state law. Unsecured Creditor's Comm.
v. Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast, Inc., 768 F.2d 580, 582 (4th Cir. 1985). However,
the attorney's fees must be reasonable. In re Wonder Corp. of Am., 72 B.R. 580, 589
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1987) (discusses elements of reasonableness).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
61. One study of 37 cases showed an average gap period of 2.5 years, with a range
from 8 months to over 8 years and a standard deviation of 1.4 years. Lawrence A. Weiss,
The Bankruptcy Code and Violations of Absolute Priority, in 4 THE CONTINENTAL
BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 71 (Summer 1991).
62. If no interim payments are made and interest is compounded monthly, the eq-
uity cushion lasts 28 months (2/ years). [(1 (.06/12))n= 1.15; n=ln 1.15/ln 1.005;
n=28 months.] The equity cushion would be exhausted in exactly two and one-half years
if no interim payments are made and compounding of interest is not allowed. The com-
pounding of interest has been allowed where state law would have permitted it. See In re
Sublett, 895 F.2d 1381, 1385 (1 lth Cir. 1990). However, the Supreme Court, in a some-
what dated opinion, has declined to compound interest. See Vanston Bondholders Protec-
tive Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946). Such an approach is unsatisfactory because
if compounding of interest is not allowed, the creditor is forced to reinvest money earned
as interest in the debtor and receive a return on this money of 0%.
63. See U.C.C. §§ 9-501, 9-507 (1977).
64. See generally THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW (1986).
than if it is liquidated piecemeal. Chapter 11 seeks to preserve this
going-concern value. 5 If the debtor complies with Chapter 1166 of
the Code, he may continue to operate the business as a debtor-in-
possession to preserve jobs for his employees and suppliers, as well as
draw salaries for himself and friends and relatives on the board of
directors.
The debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan to reorganize the
business for the first 120 days after the order for relief is granted.
17
The plan must classify the claims against the debtor and specify the
treatment of each class of claims.66 Usually, each secured claim is
placed alone in a separate class.6 9 To be confirmed, the plan must
comply with the requirements of section 1129(a).70  Section
1129(a)(8) requires that all classes of creditors either be left
unimpaired7' or, if impaired, have accepted the plan. However, even
if section 1129(a)(8) is not met, the court may still confirm the plan
under the cram down provisions of section 1129(b) if the plan does
not unfairly discriminate 2 against any dissenting impaired class of
creditors, and the plan is fair and equitable to such class. A plan is
fair and equitable to a secured creditor if (1) the secured claimant
retains a lien on the assets and receives deferred cash payments that
have a present value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least 73
65. But see James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's
Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REv,
2097 (1990).
66. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988 & Supp.II 1990).
67. Id. § 1121(b).
68. Id. § 1123(a).
69. In re Commercial W. Fin. Corp., 761 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985); In re
Holthoff, 58 B.R. 216 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985).
70. Section 1129(a) requires that (1) the plan complies with Code provisions, (2)
the proponent of the plan complies with Code provisions, for example, disclosure, (3) the
plan is made in good faith, (4) payment for services or expenses related to the plan are
approved by the court as reasonable, (5) the officers, directors and insiders of the "new"
company are disclosed, (6) any rate change, if the entity is regulated by a governmental
commission, is approved by such commission, (7) the "best interests of creditors test" is
met, (8) all impaired classes accept the plan (notwithstanding cram down), (9) at least
one impaired class of creditors accepts the plan, (10) administrative expenses and invol-
untary gap claims are provided for, (11) unsecured pre-petition third, fourth, fifth and
sixth priority claims are provided for, (12) unsecured pre-petition seventh priority tax
claims are provided for, (13) the plan is feasible in that there is a reasonable chance of
success for the reorganized company and that it is unlikely liquidation or further reor-
ganization will be needed, (14) bankruptcy fees are provided for, and (15) retiree insur-
ance benefits are protected. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1988).
71. A class is deemed impaired unless the plan (1) does not alter the legal, equita-
ble or contractual rights of the claimant, or (2) (i) cures any default, and (ii) reinstates
the original maturity date of the obligation, and (iii) pays for any damages caused by the
claimant's reliance on the contract provisions, and (iv) does not otherwise alter the claim-
ant's rights, or (3) cashes out the claimant. Id. § 1124.
72. See In re Ratledge, 31 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983).
73. The term "at least" seems to imply Congressional intent that a court err, if it
must, on the side of a higher discount rate.
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the value of the collateral, 4 or (2) the secured party receives the
indubitable equivalent 5 of his secured claim, or (3) the collateral is
sold and a lien attaches to the proceeds.7 6 The remainder of this sec-
tion focuses on the discount rate to be used to determine the present
value of deferred cash flows under alternative (1).
B. Risk Premia and Probabilistic Models
If the lender thinks that there are three chances in one hundred
that the borrower will default, he could add 3 % to the interest rate
to compensate himself for assuming the risk that the debtor will de-
fault. For example, suppose a lender has $1000 and makes one hun-
dred loans of $10, each payable an hour later.7 7 An hour later the
lender will expect payments of $10.30 ($10 plus 3 % of $10) on each
loan for a total of $1030. But 3% of these loans, or $30 worth, will
end in default. Therefore, the lender will break even only if he
charges the 3 % risk premium, or $.30 to each loan. If the lender
thinks there is a 3 % chance of default per year, he could add 3 % to
the nominal risk-free rate to break even.
However, determining the probability of default could be ex-
tremely difficult and time-consuming. Even if the probability of de-
fault were known, we would still not know how the market is
collectively pricing risk; Probability theory does not account for utili-
tarian preferences with respect to taking risks; if economic conditions
74. The present value of the deferred payments equals the value of the collateral,
which is determined by an appraisal of the collateral.
75. See In re Sun Country Dev., Inc., 764 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Murel
Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) provides:
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims,
whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or trans-
ferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims;
and (II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such
claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such
claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of
such holder's interest in the estate's interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is
subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such
liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such liens on
proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such
claims.
Id.
77. Here, an hour is used to eliminate the effects of the real rate and inflation.
Very little inflation will occur, and a very small reward will be needed during such a
small time span.
are unfavorable, the market may be collectively risk averse to lend-
ing. In such a case, risk would be priced differently than probability
theory alone would predict. Therefore, the court must refer to the
market to price this risk correctly.
C. Determining the Appropriate Discount Rate
Some courts have chosen to use the contract rate as the discount
rate used in applying section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i).7 8 If interest rates
have fallen since the contract date, businesses might have an incen-
tive to use bankruptcy as a refinancing tool. However, this concern is
probably unjustified because the costs of a bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion79 would most likely exceed the benefits of refinancing. A more
compelling argument against the contract rate is the fresh-start di-
rective8" embodied in the Code as well as the equitable powers 81
given to the court. The original contract rate should no longer apply
because the risks probably have changed since the negotiation of the
original agreement, and the new obligation is with an entity now
considered different from the original debtor since the debtor-in-pos-
session is considered to be a new entity after reorganization.
Courts82 and commentators"3 have also urged use of the yields on
risk-free Treasury obligations. However, this approach violates the
Code because using a risk-free rate on a non-risk-free obligation will
not give the creditor the present value of the deferred cash flows as
mandated by section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i).
The preferable view, as well as the trend, is to use the current
market rate of interest.84 Using a current market rate captures the
78. In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336, 1337-39 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Kauf-
funger, 16 B.R. 666, 669 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1981); In re Clements, 16 B.R. 196, 197
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
79. See Weiss, supra note 61, at 72 (professional and administrative fees associ-
ated with bankruptcy filings averaged 20% of the market value of equity where the
market value of equity was ascertained one year prior to filing).
80. See, e.g., In re Mohawk Indus., Inc., 82 B.R. 174, 177 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987)
(the right of a debtor to a fresh start makes it sufficiently distinct from its former self so
as to prevent the required mutuality for setoff of pre-petition debts owed by the debtor
against post-petition debts owed to the debtor). See also In re Virginia Block Co., 16
B.R. 771, 774-75 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1982); In re Shoppers Paradise, Inc., 8 B.R. 271
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1980).
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
82. In re Connecticut Aerosols, Inc., 42 B.R. 706 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (court
used the 52-week Treasury-bill rate on a tax claim to be paid over six years); In re
Kauffunger, 16 B.R. 666, 669 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1981); In re Clements, 16 B.R. 196, 197
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
83. Waltraud S. Scott, Comment, Deferred Cash Payments to Secured Creditors
in Cram Down of Chapter 11 Plans: A Matter of Interest, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1041
(1988) (using low, risk-free rates will increase the chance of a successful reorganization,
benefitting unsecured creditors and equity holders).
84. In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 818 F.2d 1503
(9th Cir. 1987); In re Southern States Motor Inns, Inc., 709 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir.
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price of risk through heavily-analyzed capital markets. Since debt
instruments carrying the same risk are fungible, the current market
rate for a section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) obligation will be equal to the
yield on a corporate bond with matching characteristics. In addition
to advocating use of the current market rate, Collier on Bank-
ruptcy85 defines the market rate best:
[T]he rate of interest charged in a particular market is affected by supply
of funds, present demand for funds, amount to be borrowed, duration of the
borrowing and credit risk. The range of prevailing interest rates can be
ascertained by comparing at any point in time the following: prime rate,
• . . federal funds, . . . discount rate, . . . call money, ... commercial
paper, . . . certificates of deposit, . . . treasury bills.8,
These instruments given by Collier,8 7 however, are short-term instru-
mentsss and carry zero or very little risk. Obligations with higher
credit risk and longer terms can be priced by comparison with in-
struments traded in the corporate bond markets. Discount rates (or
yields) can be obtained through frequently published, readily availa-
ble sources. Yields on corporate bonds accurately reflect the present
supply and demand for funds, adjusted for riskiness. Credit risk can
be referenced by comparing bond rating descriptions prepared by
Moody's Investors Service or Standard & Poor's Corporation.
Matching the durations of the section 1129(b)(2)(A) obligation and
the selected corporate bond is a critical issue that can only be solved
mathematically.
D. Corporate Bond Ratings
The court must consider the riskiness of deferred cash flows by
examining the characteristics of the obligation. Moody's Investors
Service evaluates debt obligations of hundreds of corporations and
briefly describes these obligations.8 9 The court must find the Moody's
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1275 (1984); In re Landscape Assocs., Inc., 81 B.R. 485,
487 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987); In re Martin, 66 B.R. 921, 927 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986);
In re Hildreth, 43 B.R. 721, 723 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1984); In re Landmark at Plaza Park,
Ltd., 7 Bankr. 653, 657 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1980); Michael S. Lurey, The Battles for Con-
firmation of Chapter 11 Plans, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY AND RE-
ORGANIZATION 757 (1989); James F. Des Marais, Note, The Proper Discount Rate
Under the Chapter 11 Cramdown Provision: Should Secured Creditors Retain Their
State Law Entitlements?, 72 VA. L. REV. 1499 (1986).
85. 5 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, % 1129.03 (L. King ed.,
15th ed. 1991).
86. Id. at 1129-83 n.45 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 1129-84.
88. Short-term Instruments are generally instruments maturing in one year or less.
89. See, e.g., Moody's Investors Service, 59:1 Moody's Bond Record 8-83 (Jan.
rating that best describes the characteristics of the sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A) obligation. This is done using the descriptions in
the Appendix, infra. Most section 1129(b)(2)(A) obligations would
not be below a "B" rating since they are fully secured at the time of
confirmation.
E. Duration
Duration is an adjusted measure of an obligation's maturity. Un-
like maturity, duration accounts for the magnitude of flows at the
time they come due. 90 Because the present value of far-in-the-future
cash flows is more sensitive to interest rate changes, duration is also
a measure of an obligation's sensitivity to future changes in the ap-
propriate risk-adjusted interest rate. By making sure that the dura-
tion and credit risk of the section 1129(b)(2)(A) obligation and the
duration and credit risk of the corporate bond are about the same,
the economic character of the section 1129(b)(2)(A) obligation will
most accurately match that of the corporate bond. At such point,
using the yield to maturity of the corporate bond is appropriate for
discounting section 1129(b)(2)(A) deferred cash flows. Duration
calculations are critical when short and long-term rates differ
greatly; that is, when the yield curve 91 is steep.
Duration relates how a percentage increase or decrease in interest
rates results in a change in the present value of the obligation and
can be expressed as follows:9 2
D % change in PV
% change in r
For example, for all obligations having a duration, D, of three years,
a one-percent increase in interest rates will lead to a three-percent
decrease in present value.93
Duration is computed by summing the contributions that the cash
flows make to the total present value, after weighing the cash flows
coming later in time more heavily.94 Later cash flows must be
1992).
90. It follows that the maturity and duration of an obligation are equal if the obli-
gation involves only one payment.
91. A yield curve is a graphical plot of bond yields versus time to maturity. If
long-term and short-term interest rates are equal, the yield curve is flat. If long-term
rates are higher than short-term rates, the yield curve is upward sloping.
92. This is an approximation. Actually, D=-(dPVPV)/(dr/(1 + r)) where PV is
the obligation's present value, r is its yield, and d is read "an infinitesimal change in."
93. It follows that if the rate set by the court on an obligation with a duration of
twelve years is one percentage point lower than the appropriate risk-adjusted rate, the
secured creditor will be undercompensated by 12% of the value of his claim.
94. Frederick Macaulay, Some Theoretical Problems Suggested by the Move-
ments of Interest Rate, Bond Yields, and Stock Prices in the United States Since 1856,
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weighted more heavily because time compounds the effect of interest
rate changes.
Duration is computed as:95
D iX (Ci / 
(1 +r))
i=1 PV
Suppose the nominal interest rate is 10%96 and four cash flows
will be received: $60 at the end of the first, second, and third six-
month periods and $1,060 at the end the second year. The luration
of these flows is 3.68 half-years, or 1.84 years:
1x($60/(1 +.05)') +2x(S60/(1 +.05)2) +3x($60/(1 +.05)3) +4x($1060/(1 +.05) 4)
$1035 $1035 $1035 $1035
If the obligation's payments are equal, the closed-form, short-cut
equation for an annuity can be used:
I +r 1+rD =-
r r(1 + r)"
F. Sample Corporate Bond Analysis
After coming up with a credit rating for the sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A) obligation by using the rating guide in the Ap-
pendix, a person then finds a pool of traded corporate bonds with the
same rating. One then must compute the duration for each bond in
the pool until a bond with a duration roughly equivalent to the sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A) obligation is found. For example, assume that
the deferred cash flows of the section 1129(b)(2)(A) obligation have
a duration of six years and a credit risk comparable to that of a
corporate bond with a rating of "Baa2." Looking through Moody's
Bond Record shows that Boise Cascade Corporation, an Idaho-based
paper-products manufacturer, has a bond issue outstanding with a
rating of Baa2.97
New York: National Bureau of Economic Research (1938) (first termed the effective
maturity concept: duration).
95. Zyi BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 441-42 (1989).
96. The nominal risk-adjusted interest rate is quoted as a per-year rate. Dividing
the nominal risk-adjusted interest rate by the number of periods per year gives the appro-
priate per-period rate. Here, the six-month rate is 5%, (10%/2).
97. Moody's Bond Record, supra note 89, at 16.
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Figure 2: Moody's Bond Issue Analysis
The duration of this bond is found by determining the duration of
the stream of payments it makes. The number after "nts." under
"Issue", in Figure 2 above, states the coupon or interest payment
rate as a percentage, which can never change. One half of 9.85 %, or
4.93 % of the face value of the bond, is paid every June 15 and De-
cember 15, with the last interest payment and payment of the face
value on June 15, 2002, the expiration date. Assuming that the note
has a face value of $1000104 and that today is January 1, 1992, in-
terest of $49 will be paid every June 15 and December 15 with the
last interest payment and principal of $1000 being paid at expira-
tion. A short cut to the summation formula above for a coupon bond
is the closed-form equation:
1 + r (1 + r) + n(c-r)
D= r c[(1 + r)7-7] + r
where c is the coupon rate per period. This bond will make twenty
interest payments of $49 followed by a $1049 payment on June 15,
2002 for a total of n=21 six-month periods. We use the yield to
maturity for r; do not use the number in the "yield" column if it is
different from the coupon rate in the "Issue" column. Here,
1 + .088 (1 + .088) + 21 (.0493 - .088) 1 e
.088 .0493 [(1 + .088)21- 1] + .088 - 11.5 periods,
or about six years.
The bond should be noncallable (N.C.) because callable bonds in-
clude a right by the debtor to pay off the obligation early. Unless the
98. "Yield" refers to the yield to maturity at the time the bond was issued, which
is now irrelevant.
99. Notes: generally refers to bonds with maturities of 10 years or less.
100. Coupon Rate.
101. Year of Maturity.
102. Payments are made semi-annually, with the last payment coming during the
underlined month of the year of expiration.
103. Not callable: the borrower may not pay off the obligation before expiration.
104. Most corporate bonds have a face value of $1000; however, knowing the face
amount of the bond is not necessary to calculate its duration.
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debtor is given this option, a noncallable bond should be chosen.
If the section 1129(b)(2)(A) obligation and the bond have a simi-
lar credit rating and close durations, the bond's yield to maturity,
here 8.80%, should be used to compute the present value of the sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A) obligation's deferred cash flows.
G. Diversifiable Risk
Risk is the likelihood that a lender will receive a bad surprise, for
example, a default. Risk is characterized by the volatility of the obli-
gation's payoff. Volatility is quantified by the amount the actual
cash flows are expected to deviate from the expected cash flows. For
example, imagine a gambling game in which a person flips a coin
and wins $1 if it comes up heads but has to pay $1 if it comes up
tails. After one hundred trials, a person could expect to be about
even. However, suppose a person wins $100,000 if the coin comes up
heads but has to pay $100,000 if it comes up tails. The second game
is riskier because at the end of one hundred trials in the second game
the chance that a person will have lost the equivalent of his house is
greater. Both games have the same expected return, zero, but the
dollar returns in the second game are more volatile. The more vola-
tile the returns on an obligation are, the more compensation is re-
quired by its holder to bear the risk.
One portion of the total risk, called systematic risk, affects the
whole market and cannot be eliminated by investing in a broad
range of securities. This risk could come from the general economy,
the business cycle or changing exchange rates. Another portion of
the total risk, diversifiable risk, is firm or industry specific. For ex-
ample, a large fall in oil prices might cause Exxon stock to go down
but General Motors stock to go up.105 Such oil-price risk can be
eliminated by holding both stocks. A person's expected return, where
he does not know how oil prices will move, will be the same, but the
portfolio consisting of these two stocks will be less volatile, thus less
risky. Therefore, the diversifiable risk is eliminated because the gain
on the General Motors stock will offset the loss on the Exxon stock.
Risk premia do not include compensation for diversifiable risk be-
cause the market has no reason to reward one for taking on risk that
can be diversified away. If a claim holder cannot hold other securi-
ties which diversify away the diversifiable risk associated with the
105. This assumes that demand for automobiles goes up if they become more af-
fordable because of lower fuel prices.
obligation, he is best off to sell the obligation to a person who can.
H. Financial Liquidity Premia
Financial liquidity premia'06 compensate the lender to the extent
the trading of the security is inhibited and the security cannot easily
be sold for cash. If a lender feels he will have difficulty trading in the
obligation for cash, he will demand a higher interest rate to offset
this difficulty. If the valuation of the creditor's underlying collateral
is inaccurate, a creditor may find that his asking price to trade away
the obligation is too high. This makes determining the present value
of the underlying collateral critical.
Unfortunately, the present value of an asset or debt obligation is
unobservable until after its own sale transaction takes place. For ex-
ample, suppose a consumer purchases a $25,000 new automobile and
then decides to sell it. Assuming the dealer's profit was $2000, the
dealer will not buy it back unless the consumer takes a $2000 loss.
Here, the dealer is quoting a bid/ask spread of $23,000/$25,000. He
will sell the car for $25,000 and buy it back for $23,000, thereby
charging the consumer $2000 to cover his costs and profits. The con-
sumer may still value the automobile close to his purchase price, but
by the time the consumer spends time and money locating another
buyer, he could end up with transaction costs amounting to $2000.
The more difficult an asset or security is to trade, the wider its bid/
ask spread will be. However, until a transaction actually takes place,
the value of an asset or security can only be estimated.
Financial liquidity premia compensate lenders for the transaction
costs they might incur if they trade their securities. Some of these
premia have been quantified in highly-efficient, heavily-traded mar-
kets. 0 It can be argued the lender should simply wait out the term
of the obligation and not be compensated for his inability to sell the
security for cash. However, if creditors must put these securities out
to compete with more liquid securities, they will suffer a loss due to
the lower liquidity. A court may offset this loss by valuing the collat-
eral at a price closer to the collateral's asking price than its bid
price, rather than by attempting to build a solution into the discount
rate. Until studies are done on financial liquidity premia for a
broader range of assets, courts should consider liquidity in this light
106. Economic liquidity premia express investors' preferences for short-term secur-
ities over long-term securities and are reflected in the current market rates on all securi-
ties. Financial liquidity premia, however, are specific to the characteristics of individual
obligations.
107. Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Liquidity, Maturity, and the Yields on
U.S. Treasury Securities, 46 J. OF FIN. 1411 (1991) (in this study, the yield on Treasury
notes and Treasury bills with the same maturities and risk-free payoffs differed by
.428 % due solely to the fact that the Treasury bills were more liquid).
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when doing collateral appraisals. 1°8 In either case, creditors will al-
ways have an incentive to make these markets more efficient to in-
crease the value of their claims through higher liquidity.
CONCLUSION
Interest rates define the terms of intertemporal trade. In applying
sections 506(b), 1111 (b) and 1129(b)(2)(A), the court supplants the
market mechanisms normally governing transactions. Although the
Code does not establish a procedure to reset the interest rate terms
of the contract, a rate should be used that reflects the risk and dura-
tion of the obligation. Thus, when either the post-petition interest
rate or post-confirmation discount rate is set, the current market rate
should be used.
Although the landscape of Chapter 11 differs from that outside
bankruptcy, capital markets can provide information that will yield
an appropriate market rate for the obligation that accounts for the
obligation's risk and duration. By consistent use of the appropriate
risk-adjusted rate, courts will eliminate economic inefficiencies that
would result otherwise. This article describes how courts have wres-
tled with this high-dollar-impact issue, and proposes a way to inter-
pret the rates generated in the capital markets for use in applying
sections 506(b), 1111(b), and 1129(b)(2)(A).
While the debtor-in-possession is under the supervision of the
court during the gap period, post-petition interest should be paid to
an oversecured creditor. The rate to award section 506(b) interest
should be based on the expected date of confirmation. This can be
done using bonds with short durations as calculated in Section III,
supra. Near confirmation, the calculation should be redone to reflect
the appropriate discount rate and comply with sections 1111(b) or
1129(b)(2)(A).
As more bankruptcy claims are traded, courts will obtain feedback
on their discount-rate decisions. By evaluating how the obligations'
remaining payments are recapitalized by traders, courts can adjust
their pricing of risk to mirror market mechanisms.
108. See generally David G. Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character
of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 Am. U. L. REv. 63 (1991).
APPENDIX
Key to Moody's Corporate Ratings*
Aaa
Bonds which are rated Aaa are judged to be of the best quality.
They carry the smallest degree of investment risk and are generally
referred to as "gilt edge." Interest payments are protected by a large
or by an exceptionally stable margin and principal is secure. While
the various protective elements are likely to change, such changes as
can be visualized are most unlikely to impair the fundamentally
strong position of such issues.
Aa
Bonds which are rated Aa are judged to be of high quality by all
standards. Together with the Aaa group they comprise what are gen-
erally known as high grade bonds. They are rated lower than the
best bonds because margins of protection may not be as large as in
Aaa securities or fluctuation of protective elements may be of
greater amplitude or there may be other elements present which
make the long-term risks appear somewhat larger than in Aaa
securities.
A
Bonds which are rated A possess many favorable investment at-
tributes and are to be considered as upper medium grade obligations.
Factors giving security to principal and interest are considered ade-
quate but elements may be present which suggest a susceptibility to
impairment sometime in the future.
Baa
Bonds which are rated Baa are considered as medium grade obli-
gations, i.e., they are neither highly protected nor poorly secured.
Interest payments and principal security appear adequate for the
present but certain protective elements may be lacking or may char-
acteristically unreliable over any great length of time. Such bonds
lack outstanding investment characteristics and in fact have specula-
tive characteristics as well.
* Moody's Bond Record, supra note 89, at 3.
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Ba
Bonds which are rated Ba are judged to have speculative elements;
their future cannot be considered as well assured. Often the protec-
tion of interest and principal payments may be very moderate and
thereby not well safeguarded during other good and bad times over
the future. Uncertainty of position characterizes bonds in this class.
B
Bonds which are rated B generally lack characteristics of the de-
sirable investment. Assurance of interest and principal payments or
of maintenance of other terms of the contract over any long period of
time may be small.
Caa
Bonds which are rated Caa are of poor standing. Such issues may
be in default or there may be present elements of danger with re-
spect to principal or interest.
Ca
Bonds which are rated Ca represent obligations which are specula-
tive in a high degree. Such issues are often in default or have other
marked shortcomings.
C
Bonds which are rated C are the lowest rated class of bonds and
issues so rated can be regarded as having extremely poor prospects
of ever attaining any real investment standing.
Note: Moody's applies numerical modifiers, 1, 2 and 3 in each ge-
neric rating classification from Aa through B in its corporate bond
rating system. The modifier 1 indicates that the security ranks in the
higher end of its generic rating category; the modifier 2 indicates a
mid-range ranking; and the modifier 3 indicates that the issue ranks
in the lower end of its generic rating category.
Interest dates and date of month of maturity are given. The under-
lined letter denotes the month of maturity:
J & J . .. January and July A & 0 ... April and October
F & A . . .February and August M & N . . .May and November
M & S ... March and September J & D . . . June and December

